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Abstract 
Faced with punishing severe offenders, why do some prefer imprisonment whereas others impose 
death? Previous research exploring death penalty attitudes has primarily focused on individual and 
cultural factors. Adopting a functional perspective, we propose that environmental features may also 
shape our punishment strategies. Individuals are attuned to the availability of resources within their 
environments. Due to heightened concerns with the costliness of repeated offending, we hypothesize 
that individuals tend toward elimination-focused punishments during times of perceived scarcity. 
Using global and United States data sets (studies 1 and 2), we find that indicators of resource scarcity 
predict the presence of capital punishment. In two experiments (studies 3 and 4), we find that acti-
vating concerns about scarcity causes people to increase their endorsement for capital punishment, 
and this effect is statistically mediated by a reduced willingness to risk repeated offenses. Perceived 
resource scarcity shapes our punishment preferences, with important policy implications. 
 
Keywords: death penalty, scarcity, resource availability, punishment 
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1. Introduction 
 
Throughout history and across societies, severe transgressors have often been punished 
with death. Researchers studying contemporary hunter-gatherer societies have consist-
ently found a custom of killing group members for severe offenses, including malicious 
sorcery, murder, theft, cheating, and betraying the group to outsiders (Boehm, 2012; Otter-
bein, 1986). Despite strong historical roots, the use of capital punishment is now politically 
controversial in much of the world. One hundred forty nations have abolished capital pun-
ishment (Amnesty International, 2017), yet the death penalty is still employed in many 
countries, including in 31 of the 50 states within the United States (Death Penalty Infor-
mation Center, 2017). 
 
1.1. Proximate and ultimate approaches to understanding death penalty attitudes 
To explain divergent attitudes toward capital punishment, researchers have primarily ex-
amined proximate explanations. For example, some researchers find that support for the 
death penalty hinges on political ideology, with conservatism significantly predicting fa-
vorability toward the death penalty (e.g., Sarat, 2001). Related constructs, such as right-
wing authoritarianism and individualist values, are also positively correlated with en-
dorsement of the death penalty (Soss, Langbein, & Metelko, 2003). At the nation level, cap-
ital punishment attitudes have been examined in relation to political stability (Miethe, Lu, 
& Deibert, 2005), tolerance for deviant behavior (Gelfand et al., 2011), fear of crime (Liang, 
Lu, Miethe, & Zhang, 2005), and social freedom (Neapolitan, 2001). However, little re-
search has empirically examined capital punishment attitudes using an evolutionary lens. 
Exploring more ultimate explanations may therefore complement and deepen our under-
standing of why and under what circumstances people endorse the death penalty. 
From an evolutionary perspective, there is ample evidence suggesting that evolved psy-
chological mechanisms can have a robust influence on attitudes and preferences in a wide 
range of domains (e.g., Griskevicius, Delton, Robertson, & Tybur, 2011; Hill, Rodeheffer, 
Durante, Griskevicius, & White, 2012; Neuberg & Schaller, 2016; White, Kenrick, Neel, & 
Neuberg, 2013). Importantly, this literature demonstrates that our psychology, prefer-
ences, and attitudes are flexible in response to features of our environment, allowing for 
the adoption of ecologically functional strategies and behavior. Here, we adopt such a 
functional perspective, proposing that our punishment preferences should also be attuned 
to the environment—specifically, the perceived availability of resources. 
 
1.2. Psychological sensitivity to resource availability 
Our human ancestors faced fluctuations in prosperity and resource availability (Chakra-
varthy & Booth, 2004; Griskevicius et al., 2013). Those better able to manage scarcity—by 
noticing its impending approach, and possessing better strategies for managing resources 
during difficult times—were more likely to survive and reproduce, leaving descendants 
with similar inclinations (White et al., 2013a). These evolved cognitive, affective, and be-
havioral strategies are likely to reside in the contemporary mind, becoming active in the 
presence of cues to scarcity (Griskevicius et al., 2011). 
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Indeed, perceptions of resource scarcity influence a range of behaviors. For example, 
Griskevicius et al. (2013) found that experimentally manipulating perceived resource scar-
city affected individuals’ financial decision-making. In a series of studies, the researchers 
demonstrated that cues to economic recession (as compared to a control condition) led 
participants with low socioeconomic status backgrounds to increase their temporal dis-
counting and preference for risky rewards. Research has also discovered a robust relation-
ship between resource availability and reproductive timing, with resource scarcity at both 
the individual and nation level associated with earlier reproduction (e.g., Griskevicius et 
al., 2011). Lee and Zietsch (2011) found that priming resource scarcity in the lab shifted 
women’s mate preferences, such that scarcity led women to favor traits indicating parental 
quality (e.g., “commitment” and “nurturing”) rather than traits indicating genetic quality 
(e.g., “intelligence” and “muscularity”). Beyond these effects, perceptions of scarcity have 
also influenced food choice (Laran & Salerno, 2013), categorization of racially ambiguous 
faces (Rodeheffer, Hill, & Lord, 2012), moral behavior (Sharma, Mazar, Alter, & Ariely, 
2014), and attitudes toward economic redistribution (White et al., 2013a). 
The logic underlying each of the findings above draws from the same premise: the avail-
ability of resources in one’s environment affects the costs and benefits of adopting partic-
ular strategies. Inclinations and behaviors that enhance fitness in times of abundance may 
be maladaptive in times of scarcity, and vice versa. Our psychology has therefore evolved 
to flexibly—and functionally—respond to cues of resource availability. 
 
1.3. Resource scarcity and attitudes toward the death penalty 
Here, we propose that preferences for certain punishment strategies—specifically, capital 
punishment—also reflect sensitivity to resource availability. Punishing those who threaten 
group functioning is critical to successful human interdependence and cooperation (Boyd 
& Richerson, 2006; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2008). However, monitoring and punishing devi-
ance is energetically costly. Resources spent monitoring and punishing transgressors within 
the group necessarily reduce the resources that can be spent on alternative tasks (e.g., ac-
quiring food, shelter, and mates; protecting the group from outside threats). In addition, 
rehabilitating serious transgressors comes at some risk of failure. 
On the other hand, the loss of a potentially useful group member through exile or death 
also carries costs—especially ancestrally, when humans lived in small, highly interdepend-
ent groups. This suggests that evaluating the opportunity costs associated with keeping 
severe transgressors in the group is inherently influenced by the severity of the threat 
posed by the transgressor; elimination-focused punishments should be reserved for 
wrongdoers who pose the most serious of threats. Supporting this notion is work by Boehm 
(2012), indicating that in forager groups, elimination-focused punishments are utilized 
when there is group agreement that certain individuals must be purged from the group, 
lest the survival of the entire group is threatened (see also Otterbein, 1986). Thus, when 
determining punishment of serious offenders, group members must weigh the relative 
costs and benefits of eliminating the threat against rehabilitating the transgressor. 
This process reflects a functional error management system (Haselton & Nettle, 2006; 
Nesse, 2005), in which determinations are likely to favor the least costly error. In the cost-
benefit analysis at hand, two possible errors can be made: individuals might (1) remove an 
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offender who can be successfully reintegrated and offer valuable future contributions to 
the group, or (2) keep an offender within the group whose rehabilitation is unsuccessful 
and who imposes future costs on the group. We suggest that the availability of resources 
in one’s environment affects the weighting of possible errors associated with expunging 
serious transgressors from the group. That is, which of these two errors is likely to be cost-
lier depends in part on whether resources are abundant or scarce. 
When resources are abundant, investing in the rehabilitation and reintegration of trans-
gressors may prevent the loss of a potentially valuable group member at a relatively man-
ageable cost to the group. Conversely, resource scarcity places the group in a precarious 
position, and the potential costs of keeping serious criminal offenders within the group 
may be prohibitively large. Given a bias toward making the less costly of possible errors 
(Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Nesse, 2005), people may favor harsher, elimination-focused 
punishments when resources are scarce. Consequently, we hypothesized that perceptions 
of resource scarcity increase favorability toward capital punishment. 
We note here the underlying assumption of our approach: whatever the relative costs 
of keeping severe transgressors in the group versus permanent removal of these individu-
als, these costs are likely to be greater when resources are scarce as compared to when 
resources are abundant. Our purpose here is not to directly test the assumption that the 
cost of transgression is especially high under times of scarcity, but to explore its implica-
tions in the context of modern-day attitudes toward the death penalty. If, however, we are 
incorrect in our underlying assumption, the predicted effects should not manifest. 
To test our general hypothesis, we adopted two complementary strategies. First, using 
archival data, we examined whether a real-world relationship exists between resource 
availability and death penalty usage (Studies 1 & 2). Second, we examined the causal con-
nection between resources and death penalty beliefs at the individual level by experimen-
tally manipulating perceived resource availability and measuring beliefs about the death 
penalty and our putative mediator (Studies 3 & 4). 
 
2. Study 1 
 
Study 1 investigated the relationship between resource scarcity and death penalty laws at 
the nation level. As proxy for a country’s level of resource availability, we obtained global 
data on human development in the 131 countries for which these measures were available. 
We also collected information about death penalty laws in each of these countries, creating 
a binary code indicating whether each country maintains capital punishment as a matter 
of law. We predicted that countries with lower human development would be more likely 
to maintain capital punishment than countries with higher human development. 
 
2.1. Materials and methods 
We first obtained global data on human development to use as our proxy for resource 
scarcity. Human development data were taken from the Inequality-Adjusted Human De-
velopment Index (IHDI) (2011). In evaluating and selecting our measure of resource scar-
city, we considered a number of factors. First, it was necessary that the measure provide 
an accurate representation of resource harshness for the country as a whole. Thus, Gross 
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Domestic Product (GDP) was inappropriate, as it would depict countries with large—but 
highly concentrated—wealth as resource abundant when a substantial portion of the pop-
ulation lives in resource scarce conditions (e.g., India). 
Second, we sought a measure that would capture a holistic account of resource depri-
vation, to better approximate the multidimensionality of environmental harshness in a 
global setting. The IHDI is a nation-level measure of human development adjusted for in-
equality in a society and is compiled by the United Nations Development Programme. 
Three dimensions of “development” are captured by the IHDI: the extent to which resi-
dents of the country live long healthy lives (i.e., life expectancy); the extent to which resi-
dents experience a decent standard of living (i.e., personal income); and the extent to which 
residents are educated (i.e., years of schooling). Each of these dimensions is directly rele-
vant for gauging economic resources: (1) socioeconomic factors are robustly linked to mor-
tality (e.g., Stringhini et al., 2017); (2) personal income offers a direct measure of financial 
resources; and (3) years of education is robustly linked to lifetime earning (e.g., Oreopoulos 
& Petronijevic, 2013). IHDI scores were obtained from the 131 countries for which this 
measure was available. We note that, unlike GDP, the IHDI is independent of population 
size. However, countries with larger population sizes generally experience more crime 
(e.g., Nolan, 2004), which may affect attitudes toward the death penalty. Therefore, we 
gathered information about the population size of each country to include as a potential 
covariate in our analyses. This information was obtained from the CIA World Factbook 
(2011). 
Finally, we gathered information about death penalty laws in each country from Am-
nesty International (2012). We then created a binary code indicating whether each country 
maintains the death penalty as a matter of law. When determining whether a country 
maintains the death penalty, we coded each country as a single unit. Thus, if one region of 
a nation maintains the death penalty while others do not (as in the United States) that 
country was coded as having the death penalty. 
 
2.2. Focal results 
To test our hypothesis that countries with lower human development would be more likely 
to maintain the death penalty, we conducted a series of logistic regressions. As predicted, 
countries with lower IHDI scores—indicating lower levels of income and development—
were significantly more likely to have the death penalty (β = −5.76, Nagelkere R2 (overall 
model) = 0.30, p < .001). See Table 1. Given that countries with larger populations likely 
have increased crime rates, we tested whether these findings held after controlling for pop-
ulation size by running a logistic regression with population size and human development 
as predictors. They did: although population size significantly predicted death penalty 
laws (p = .01), human development remained a significant predictor of countries maintain-
ing death penalty laws (β = −6.03, Nagelkerke R2 (overall model) = 0.38, p < .001). See Table 
2. 
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Table 1. Study 1. Summary of Regression Analysis for IHDI 
Predicting Whether a Country Maintains Death Penalty Laws 
(N = 131) 
Variable β (p) SE β 
IHDI –5.76 (< .001) 1.15 
R2  .30 
 
Table 2. Study 1. Summary of Regression Analysis for Population 
and IHDI Predicting Whether a Country Maintains Death 
Penalty Laws (N = 131) 
Variable β (p) SE β 
Population .01 (.01) .004 
IHDI –6.03 (< .001) 1.21 
R2  .38 
 
2.3. Additional analyses 
As discussed above, one advantage of the IHDI as a proxy measure for resource scarcity is 
that it provides a more accurate depiction of a country’s deprivation by adjusting for ine-
quality. One possibility, however, is that inequality itself might drive capital punish-
ment—for example, by increasing homicide rates (Daly, 2016). For exploratory purposes, 
we therefore obtained measures of income equality (Gini coefficients) in all countries for 
which these data were available (CIA World Factbook, 2012) to test whether inequality, 
per se, also predicts presence of the death penalty. 
As with our analyses using the IHDI, we first conducted a logistic regression with in-
come inequality as the sole predictor of presence of the death penalty; inequality did not 
predict presence of death penalty laws in this model (β = 0.03, p = .13). A second model 
containing both inequality and population size as predictors also indicated no relationship 
between inequality and presence of the death penalty (β = 0.032, p = .152); population size 
remained a significant predictor of countries maintaining death penalty laws (p = .005). 
 
2.4. Conclusions 
The first study provides preliminary evidence of a relationship between real-world re-
source scarcity and use of the death penalty. In addition, this relationship appears to be 
driven by the overall extent of deprivation in a country, rather than its distribution. How-
ever, a number of potential confounds exist, including the various cultural differences pre-
sent across countries. Of course, such cultural confounds do not necessarily constitute al-
ternative explanations. Rather, they may merely be more proximate mechanisms through 
which ecological factors such as resource scarcity have their effects. Nonetheless, Study 2 
explored whether these patterns would emerge within a more culturally homogenous con-
text by examining the relationship between resource availability and death penalty laws 
at the state level within the United States. 
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3. Study 2 
 
In the United States, individual state legislation determines whether the death penalty is 
available as a possible punishment. As proxy for a state’s level of resource availability, we 
obtained state per capita income data for each of the 50 states. We also collected infor-
mation about death penalty laws in each of these states, again employing a binary code 
indicating whether the state maintains capital punishment as a matter of law. We predicted 
that states with lower per capita income would be more likely to maintain capital punish-
ment than states with higher per capita income. 
 
3.1. Measures 
Although state-level variability in income inequality exists, this variability is far less pro-
nounced between states in the United States than between countries around the globe (CIA 
World Factbook, 2017). Therefore, as compared to our country-level investigation in Study 
1, we did not have similar concerns about within-state inequality distorting our data in 
Study 2. Thus, we selected state per capita income as a direct measure of resource availa-
bility. State per capita data for each of the 50 states was gathered from the United States 
Department of Commerce (2011). To maintain consistency with our broader conceptual-
ization of resource deprivation, we also gathered data on state life expectancy (a compo-
nent of IHDI in Study 1). These data were collected from the Measure of America (2014). 
In anticipating alternative explanations for our findings, we collected several measures 
to include as covariates. First, state population size data were collected from the United 
States Census Bureau (2012). Second, state murder rate data were collected from the Death 
Penalty Information Center (2012). Finally, a measure of state political ideology was ob-
tained from a Gallup State Ideology Survey (2012). 
Following our procedure in Study 1, we gathered information about death penalty laws 
in each state (Death Penalty Information Center, 2012) and created a binary code indicating 
whether each state maintains the death penalty as a matter of law. 
 
3.2. Results 
To test our hypothesis—that states with lower per capita income and lower life expectancy 
would be more likely to maintain the death penalty—we conducted a series of logistic re-
gressions. First, we ran logistic regressions using only our measure of resource deprivation 
as a predictor. As predicted, we found that states with lower per capita income were more 
likely to have the death penalty (β = –1.51, Nagelkerke R2 (overall model) = 0.20, p = .01). 
Also as predicted, states with lower life expectancy were more likely to have the death 
penalty (β = –0.67, Nagelkerke R2 (overall model) = 0.23, p = .01). 
We then examined whether these effects would persist when state population size, murder 
rate, and political ideology were included in three separate regression models containing 
state per capita income. Results, including standardized beta coefficients and indicators of 
effect size, are summarized in Table 3. As predicted, state per capita income remained a 
significant predictor of death penalty laws after controlling for population size and murder 
rate in separate logistic regression analyses (both ps ≤ .03). Further, neither population size 
nor murder rate were significant predictors of death penalty usage in these models (both 
W I L L I A M S  E T  A L . ,  E V O L U T I O N  A N D  H U M A N  B E H A V I O R  4 0  (2 0 1 9 )  
8 
ps > .12). In the model controlling for political ideology, states with lower per capita income 
remained marginally more likely to have the death penalty (p = .098). Consistent with pre-
vious research, politically conservative states trended toward having the death penalty, 
but the effect was nonsignificant (p = .12) in this model. 
 
Table 3. Study 2. Summary of Regression Analyses (3 Separate Analyses) for State Per Capita 
Predicting Whether a State Maintains Death Penalty Laws (N = 50) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable  β (p) SE β  β (p) SE β  β (p) SE β 
Per Capita Income  –1.59 (0.008) .60  –1.34 (.03) .60  –1.11 (.10) .67 
Population  .07 (.25) .06       
Murder Rate     .29 (.12) .19    
Political Ideology        .09 (.12) .06 
R2   .24   .26   .26 
 
Finally, we examined whether the effect of life expectancy would persist in three sepa-
rate logistic regression models also containing either population size, murder rate, or po-
litical ideology. Again, life expectancy remained a significant or marginally significant pre-
dictor of death penalty laws in each model (all ps ≤ .08); see Table 4. Population size, 
murder rate, and political ideology did not significantly predict death penalty laws in their 
respective models (all ps > .18). 
 
Table 4. Study 2. Summary of Regression Analyses (3 Separate Analyses) for Life Expectancy 
Predicting Whether a State Maintains Death Penalty Laws (N = 50) 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable  β (p) SE β  β (p) SE β  β (p) SE β 
Life Expectancy  –.71 (.009) .27  –.58 (.054) .30  –.51 (.08) .29 
Population  .06 (.22) .05       
Murder Rate     .11 (.59) .21    
Political Ideology        .08 (.18) .06 
R2   .27   .24   .27 
 
3.3. Conclusions 
Study 2 provides further supporting evidence that indicators of resource scarcity predict 
the presence of death penalty laws. Within the United States, states with lower per capita 
incomes and lower life expectancies are more likely to have capital punishment. These ef-
fects were observed despite inherently limited statistical power (50 states) and persisted 
after controlling for state population size, murder rate, and political ideology. 
 
4. Study 3 
 
Studies 1 and 2 provide initial evidence supporting a relationship between resource avail-
ability and use of the death penalty; however, the correlational nature of archival data pre-
cludes causal interpretation of these results. Additionally, Studies 1 and 2 are focused on 
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whether resource availability is related to the maintenance of death penalty laws and do 
not directly assess individual psychology. Thus, in Study 3, we experimentally manipu-
lated perceived resource availability to test whether resource scarcity causally shifts indi-
viduals’ endorsement of the death penalty. We also explored whether our predicted effects 
would hold after controlling for participants’ political ideology (the dominant extant ex-
planation for death penalty attitudes) and socioeconomic status (an indicator of chronic 
resource availability). Given that threats to resource availability affect individuals across 
SES groups, we expected to see effects of the resource scarcity manipulation in both high- 
and low-SES individuals. 
 
4.1. Materials and methods 
 
4.1.1. Participants 
One hundred twenty-eight participants (64 women; Mage = 39.78) were recruited in 2013 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk for a “Social Beliefs Survey.” We aimed to recruit at 
least 50 participants per condition. In selecting our sample size, we examined previous 
studies employing similar resource availability manipulations (Griskevicius et al., 2013; 
Rodeheffer et al., 2012). However, we were mindful that death penalty attitudes tend to be 
strongly held and difficult to influence; thus, we anticipated a small effect size. Participants 
received $0.50 compensation for completing the study. 
 
4.1.2. Procedure 
Each participant read a description of the study and provided informed consent before 
beginning the experiment. Participants were then instructed to carefully examine a series 
of photographs and accompanying text. Participants were randomly assigned to view one 
of two stories. Participants in the resource scarcity condition viewed photographs suggest-
ing current economic hardship. Accompanying text indicated a continuing stagnation of 
the economy, with high unemployment, economic collapse, and frequent home foreclo-
sures. The photos and text suggested that these current trends are likely to continue in the 
future. Participants in the resource abundance condition viewed photographs suggesting 
economic prosperity. Accompanying text indicated that the current economy is in an up-
swing, with high job growth, rising stock prices, higher pay, and many new home pur-
chases. The photos and text also suggested that the current economic situation would con-
tinue to improve in the future. We note that Studies 3 & 4 were conducted in the years 
following the Great Recession—a time when the United States economic condition was 
somewhat ambiguous, and either of the induction scenarios would have been plausible to 
the average person. These manipulations have been successfully employed in past research 
examining the effects of resource scarcity on psychological processes (e.g., Rodeheffer et 
al., 2012; White et al., 2013a). 
Immediately after viewing the photos and text, participants completed a self-report 
measure assessing death penalty attitudes. For exploratory purposes, participants also 
completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008). Finally, 
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participants responded to a number of demographic items assessing gender, socioeco-
nomic status, and political ideology. Participants were then fully debriefed and thanked 
for their time. 
 
4.1.3. Death penalty attitudes measure 
Participants responded to three items assessing endorsement of the death penalty: “I think 
the death penalty is necessary,” “The death penalty should be used more often than it is,” 
and “The length of time between sentencing someone to death and actually executing them 
should be shorter than it currently is.” Items were adapted from previous research exam-
ining death penalty attitudes (O’Neil, Patry, & Penrod, 2004). Responses were reported on 
a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). A scale composite of 
these items was created (α = .87), which comprised our focal dependent variable. 
 
4.1.4. Socioeconomic status measure 
Participants reported their subjective socioeconomic status (SES) by responding to the 
item, “How would you describe your family’s social-economic class, in terms of household 
income?” on a scale ranging from 1 (“Poor”) to 5 (“Upper class”). 
 
4.1.5. Political ideology measure 
Participants provided a self-reported assessment of their political ideology on a single item 
ranging from –50 (“Very Liberal”) to +50 (“Very Conservative”). 
 
4.1.6. Focal results 
We predicted that individuals in the resource scarcity condition would exhibit greater en-
dorsement of the death penalty than those in the resource abundance condition. To test 
our prediction, we regressed the death penalty endorsement composite onto the dummy-
coded resource availability manipulation. A marginally significant effect of resource avail-
ability emerged, such that participants in the resource scarcity condition reported greater 
endorsement of the death penalty (Mpredicted = 5.83, SEpredicted = .44) than participants in the 
resource abundance condition (Mpredicted = 5.07, SEpredicted = .31) (β = .16, p = .08).1 
We next explored whether our effects held after controlling for participants’ political 
ideology and socioeconomic status. To examine whether resource availability influenced 
attitudes toward the death penalty above and beyond the effects of participants’ socioeco-
nomic status and political ideology, we regressed participants’ reported endorsement of 
the death penalty onto socioeconomic status, political ideology, and resource condition, as 
well as all interaction terms in a single regression model. Results, as shown in Table 5, 
indicated a significant main effect of participant socioeconomic status, such that individu-
als with lower socioeconomic status reported greater endorsement of the death penalty 
than individuals with higher socioeconomic status (β = –.25, p = .03). A main effect of po-
litical ideology also emerged, such that conservative participants reported greater endorse-
ment of the death penalty than liberal participants (β = .33, p = .01). However, despite these 
findings, the marginally significant main effect of resource availability on endorsement of 
the death penalty persisted and approached statistical significance (β = .16, p = .07). None 
of the interaction terms were significant (all ps > .17). 
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Table 5. Study 3. Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Participants’ Endorsement 
of the Death Penalty (N = 120) 
Variable β (p) SE β 
Resource Scarcity .16 (.07) .09 
Socioeconomic Status –.25 (.03) .12 
Political Ideology .33 (.01) .13 
Socioeconomic Status × Resource Scarcity Interaction –.01 (.92) .12 
Political Ideology × Resource Scarcity Interaction –.11 (.43) .13 
Political Ideology × Socioeconomic Status Interaction .18 (.17) .13 
Socioeconomic Status × Resource Scarcity × Political Ideology Interaction –.11 (.42) .13 
R2  .19 
 
4.1.7. Additional analyses 
In anticipating potential alternative explanations for our findings, we considered whether 
scarcity of resources would lead individuals to indiscriminately lash out at others, rather 
than specifically shaping preferences for capital punishment. For example, previous re-
search in social psychology suggests that feeling bad about oneself can lead individuals to 
denigrate others as a way of increasing self-esteem (e.g., Allen & Sherman, 2011). Addi-
tional research suggests that feelings of stress and anxiety are associated with greater ego-
centrism and reduced perspective taking (e.g., Todd, Forstmann, Burgmer, Brooks, & Ga-
linsky, 2015). If so, greater endorsement of the death penalty under conditions of resource 
scarcity might simply reflect a general elevation in callousness or disregard for others.2 
Three items from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2008), 
initially included in our study for exploratory purposes outside the scope of the present 
hypotheses, enabled us to investigate whether our scarcity manipulation led to increased 
callousness. The questionnaire prompts participants to report the extent to which they con-
sider certain factors when deciding something is right or wrong. Participants report the 
importance of each factor on a 6-point scale ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). The three considerations relevant for assessing callousness are as follows: “whether 
or not someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable,” “whether or not someone suffered 
emotionally,” and “whether or not someone was cruel.” These items were selected for their 
face-validity as indicators of one’s disregard for the plight of others. 
We separately regressed responses to each of the callousness items onto the dummy-
coded resource availability condition and found that the resource manipulation did not 
affect participants’ responses to any of these items (all ps > .35). This suggests that activat-
ing scarcity concerns led to increased endorsement of the death penalty, specifically, rather 
than a general increase in cold-heartedness. 
 
4.2. Conclusions 
Our predictions received marginally significant support, with participants in the resource 
scarcity condition preferring the death penalty as compared to participants in the resource 
abundance condition. As expected, these effects were relatively small. Death penalty atti-
tudes tend to be long-held, principled, and strong (Ellsworth & Ross, 1983). Therefore, they 
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are robust against minor laboratory interventions. By including individuals who were ad-
amantly opposed to the death penalty in our sample, we made it even more difficult to 
detect our effects. Yet, despite being small in size, an effect of scarcity on endorsement of the 
death penalty emerged and did not appear to reflect a mere increase in general callousness. 
Our findings also persisted after controlling for participants’ political ideology, were 
not explained solely by differences in participant SES, and participant SES did not moder-
ate the effect of resource condition on endorsement of the death penalty. Although at first 
glance this might appear surprising, it coheres with previous research examining scarcity’s 
effects on behavior. For example, both White and colleagues (2013a) and Hill et al. (2012) 
fail to find moderating effects of SES when exploring scarcity’s effects on attitudes toward 
redistribution and consumer spending, respectively. Here we have argued that, regardless 
of one’s objective economic standing, activating concerns about resource scarcity leads in-
dividuals to consider their potential losses; thus, scarcity should threaten both high- and 
low-SES individuals. We continue to explore the potential effects of participant SES in 
Study 4, with the inclusion of a more robust measure of SES. 
Study 3 provides initial, albeit tenuous, support for a causal relationship between re-
source scarcity and increased favorability toward the death penalty. We propose that this 
relationship may reflect the workings of a functional error management system (Haselton 
& Nettle, 2006; Nesse, 2005). Survival is more precarious when resources are scarce than 
when resources are abundant; thus, given the energetic costs (and possible failure) of re-
habilitation, the risks and costs associated with giving “second chances” to serious offend-
ers are likely to be relatively high. We therefore predicted that error management might 
lead individuals to increase endorsement of capital punishment during times of perceived 
scarcity by increasing the perceived risks of keeping convicted murderers alive. Study 4 
aimed to test this putative mediating mechanism, in addition to serving as a replication of 
the causal link between perceived resource scarcity and increased endorsement of the 
death penalty suggested by Study 3. 
 
5. Study 4 
 
In Study 3, we found initial experimental evidence that perceived resource scarcity leads 
individuals to increase their favorability toward the death penalty. In Study 4, we test our 
proposed mediator, predicting that resource scarcity increases the perceived risks of keep-
ing severe transgressors in the group, thereby increasing favorability toward elimination-
focused punishments (such as the death penalty). 
Although there is surface similarity between beliefs about the risks of keeping convicted 
criminals alive and general endorsement of the death penalty, these variables are concep-
tually distinct. Our measure of death penalty endorsement assesses how one feels toward 
the death penalty, generally speaking (i.e., Is it good or bad? Should we have more of it or 
less of it?). In contrast, the cost of error measure assesses why the death penalty should be 
employed. There are numerous reasons why an individual might favor the death pen-
alty—for example, a desire for revenge, belief in its deterrent effect, belief in its cost effec-
tiveness, or a general belief that murderers deserve to die (O’Neil et al., 2004). The cost of 
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error measure captures one specific calculus for why the death penalty should be em-
ployed—a product of weighing the risks associated with keeping severe transgressors alive. 
Our mediation analysis thus aims to test whether resource scarcity leads individuals to 
recalibrate the risks of keeping convicted murderers alive, thereby shifting how positively 
they feel toward the death penalty. 
In addition, Study 4 examines whether these effects are limited to individuals for whom 
the death penalty is a viable punishment option under at least some circumstances (“death 
qualified” individuals). In the United States, “death qualification” is an exclusion criterion 
authorized by the Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968; see also Lockhart v. McCree, 
1986). It is used in capital cases to prohibit individuals who are extremely attitudinally 
committed to their view of the death penalty (either as a staunch abolitionist or as a staunch 
supporter for every guilty defendant no matter the circumstances) from serving as jurors. 
From the law’s perspective, staunch abolitionists will never vote to execute, and staunch 
supporters will always vote to execute. Thus, these jurors are pre-committed to a position 
and assumed to be unresponsive to information presented during the penalty phase of a 
capital case. Given that the law requires jurors to listen and use such information in reach-
ing their judgments, both staunch abolitionists and staunch supporters are excluded from 
service, because they are, effectively, unable to follow the law. 
Including this same criterion in our study serves two valuable purposes. First, it in-
creases the ecological validity of the findings by limiting the sample to individuals whose 
attitude toward the death penalty would permit them to serve as jurors in capital cases in 
the United States. Second, it establishes a cogent boundary condition for our findings. We 
do not suggest that a mere laboratory prime activating concerns of resource availability is 
sufficient to alter strongly held convictions about the appropriateness of the death penalty. 
Although the psychological mechanisms under study are the same for death qualified and 
non-death-qualified participants, the law does not believe abolitionist jurors will budge 
from their predetermined position; we extend this logic to participants in the lab. Thus, 
our prediction is that, with respect to individuals for whom the death penalty is a conceiv-
able punishment option, perceived resource scarcity will lead these individuals to increase 
their favorability toward the death penalty. 
 
5.1. Materials and methods 
 
5.1.1. Participants 
Two hundred four participants (70 female, Mage = 33.98 years) were recruited in 2014 
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for $0.50 compensation. This sample size 
was determined in consideration of our Study 3 effect sizes and to ensure a sufficient num-
ber of death qualified participants. 
 
5.1.2. Procedure 
Participants were told they would take part in a study examining individuals’ perceptions 
of different environments and provided their informed consent before beginning the ex-
periment. Participants were then instructed to carefully examine a series of photographs 
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and accompanying text, and to imagine themselves in the environments presented. Partic-
ipants were then randomly assigned to view one of the two conditions employed in Study 
3, indicating either that the economy is currently suffering or prosperous. After viewing 
the photos and text, participants were asked to respond to questions about their attitudes 
regarding the criminal justice system. These measures included questions assessing par-
ticipants’ calculation of risks (our putative mediating mechanism), general endorsement 
of the death penalty, and a death qualification item. Participants then completed the de-
mographic measures described in Study 3, including a revised measure of socioeconomic 
status. Finally, participants were fully debriefed and thanked for their time. 
 
5.1.3. Cost of error measure 
We predicted that resource scarcity increases endorsement of the death penalty by shifting 
participants’ perceived cost of error in favor of executing convicted murderers. This mental 
calculation of risks associated with keeping transgressors in the group was measured with 
five Likert-type items ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Items included 
“Keeping convicted murderers alive is too great a risk for society to take,” “It is better to 
execute convicted murderers than risk they will murder again,” and “The death penalty is 
the only way to ensure a convicted murderer does not murder again.” Responses to these 
items were aggregated to form a scale composite score (α = 0.92). 
 
5.1.4. Death penalty attitudes measure 
Participants responded to six items assessing their general endorsement of the death penalty, 
including items utilized in Study 3 (e.g., “The death penalty should be used more often 
than it is”). The number of items was increased with the aim of developing a more sensitive, 
finely tuned measure of favorability toward the death penalty. Responses were reported 
on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and were aggregated 
to form a scale composite score (α = 0.96). As expected, the death penalty endorsement 
measure was significantly correlated with the cost of error measure, r = .84, p < .001. 
 
5.1.5. Death qualification measure 
We approximated the judicial exclusion process in our study with the following item: “Do 
you feel so strongly about the death penalty (either for or against it) that it would prevent 
or substantially impair the performance of your duty as a juror in a capital case?” Individ-
uals were asked to respond either “yes” or “no” to this item. The language of the death 
qualification item mirrors that used by judges when evaluating potential jurors for capital 
cases. Participants who responded “yes” to this item (n = 80) were excluded from our main 
analyses, though we report findings from both groups below. 
Prior to conducting our focal analyses, we examined whether participants’ responses to 
the death qualification screening item were influenced by the resource availability manip-
ulation and found that they were not, χ2 (1, N = 204) = .12, p > .25. 
 
5.1.6. Participant socioeconomic status 
To better evaluate the potential effect of participants’ SES on attitudes toward the death 
penalty, we included the same single-item measure as Study 3 and a 4-item self-report 
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measure of subjective socioeconomic status (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2011). Items from the 
latter measure were reported on a 7-point scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly 
Agree, and included, “I currently have enough money to buy things I want” and “I don’t 
currently need to worry too much about paying my bills.” Responses were aggregated to 
form a scale composite score (α = .91). 
 
5.2. Results 
 
5.2.1. Death qualified participants 
We hypothesized that resource scarcity increases endorsement of the death penalty by 
shifting individuals’ perceptions of the risks associated with keeping severe transgressors 
in the group. Study 4 tested these predictions by manipulating information regarding re-
source availability, measuring people’s perceived cost of error and endorsement of the 
death penalty, and testing whether threat-induced differences in cost of error statistically 
mediates the relationship between resource availability and attitudes toward the death 
penalty. Here, we present findings for the death-qualified and non-death-qualified partic-
ipants separately. Results from the combined sample mirror those for the death qualified 
participants—albeit with smaller effects—and are presented in the Supplement. 
Replicating our main finding from Study 3, “death qualified” participants exposed to 
the resource scarcity manipulation reported greater endorsement of the death penalty 
(Mpredicted = 4.89, SEpredicted = .25) than participants exposed to the resource abundance ma-
nipulation (Mpredicted = 4.25, SEpredicted = .18) (β = .23, p = .01). As in Study 3, we regressed 
participants’ reported endorsement of the death penalty onto socioeconomic status, polit-
ical ideology, and resource condition as well as all interaction terms in a single regression 
model. As before, the effect of resource availability held controlling for participant socio-
economic status and political ideology. Although participants’ political conservatism was 
once again a significant predictor of endorsement of the death penalty (β = .44, p = .001), 
the effect of resource scarcity on death penalty endorsement persisted (β = .20, p = .02). 
Here, unlike in Study 3, participants’ socioeconomic status was not a significant predictor 
of death penalty endorsement using the composite measure (p = .54) or single-item measure 
(p = .47). None of the interaction terms were significant using either measure (all ps > .17). 
See Table 6 (reporting findings using the composite SES measure). 
 
Table 6. Study 4. Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Death Qualified 
Participants’ Endorsement of the Death Penalty (N = 120) 
Variable β (p) SE β 
Resource Scarcity .20 (.02) .08 
Socioeconomic Status –.07 (.54) .12 
Political Ideology .44 (.001) .12 
Socioeconomic Status × Resource Scarcity Interaction .16 (.17) .12 
Political Ideology × Resource Scarcity Interaction –.15 (.23) .12 
Socioeconomic Status × Political Ideology Interaction –.12 (.32) .12 
Socioeconomic Status × Resource Scarcity × Political Ideology Interaction .02 (.83) .11 
R2  .21 
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In a similar regression model, we then examined whether resource scarcity shifted par-
ticipants’ perceived cost of error in favor of executing convicted murderers. As predicted, 
participants primed with resource scarcity reported greater willingness to err on the side 
of executing convicted murderers (Mpredicted = 4.44, SEpredicted = .23) than participants primed 
with resource abundance (Mpredicted = 3.67, SEpredicted = .17) (β = .29, p = .001). Including par-
ticipant socioeconomic status and political ideology as covariates did not significantly alter 
this result. Participants’ socioeconomic status was not a significant predictor of participants’ 
cost of error in favor of execution (composite measure: p = .13; single-item measure: p = .61). 
Although participants’ political conservatism was a significant predictor of participants’ 
cost of error in favor of execution (β = .32, p = .01), the effect of resource scarcity still ac-
counted for a significant proportion of variance in perceived cost of error (β = .27, p = .003). 
Moreover, this effect was not moderated by socioeconomic status, political ideology, or the 
interaction of the two (all ps > .24). See Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Study 4. Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Death Qualified 
Participants’ Perceived Cost of Error (N = 121) 
Variable β (p) SE β 
Resource Scarcity .27 (.003) .09 
Socioeconomic Status –.18 (.13) .12 
Political Ideology .32 (.01) .13 
Socioeconomic Status × Resource Scarcity Interaction .14 (.24) .12 
Political Ideology × Resource Scarcity Interaction –.07 (.56) .12 
Socioeconomic Status × Political Ideology Interaction –.07 (.57) .12 
Socioeconomic Status × Resource Scarcity × Political Ideology Interaction –.05 (.65) .12 
R2  .18 
 
To examine whether differences in perceived cost of error statistically mediated shifts 
in endorsement of the death penalty, we used Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping 
method to test for a significant indirect effect of resource scarcity on endorsement of the 
death penalty for 5,000 bootstrapped samples. The indirect effect of resource scarcity on 
endorsement of the death penalty was estimated to lie between 0.225 and 0.956 with 95% 
confidence (β = 0.588, SE = 0.185). Because zero was not included in the 95% confidence 
intervals, this analysis demonstrates significant statistical mediation. The scarcity threat 
prime altered participants’ cost of error, which in turn predicted participants’ endorsement 
of the death penalty. The direct effect of scarcity on endorsement of the death penalty be-
comes statistically nonsignificant when cost of error is included in the equation (p = .61), 
suggesting full mediation (Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. Standardized regression coefficients and p-values for the relationship between 
resource scarcity and endorsement of the death penalty as mediated by cost of error 
(Study 4). 
 
5.2.2. Non-death-qualified participants 
We would not expect to find a significant effect of resource scarcity or cost of error within 
participants who are not “death qualified”; our hypotheses were specific to individuals for 
whom the death penalty could be considered, under at least some circumstances, an ac-
ceptable punishment strategy. Indeed, non-death-qualified participants primed with re-
source scarcity did not exhibit increased favorability toward the death penalty as com-
pared to those primed with resource abundance (β = 0.05, p = .70), and non-death-qualified 
participants primed with resource scarcity did not differ from participants primed with 
resource abundance in reported willingness to err on the side of executing convicted mur-
derers (β = 0.01, p = .93). Thus, individuals who are staunchly confirmed in their beliefs 
(either for or against the death penalty) do not increase their favorability toward capital 
punishment in response to our resource scarcity prime. Given how strongly held these 
beliefs tend to be, it is unsurprising that our effects are specific to only those individuals 
whose openness to the death penalty would qualify them to serve as jurors on a capital 
case in the United States. 
 
5.3. Conclusions 
Study 4, using a “death qualified” sample, replicated Study 3 and further supported our hy-
potheses. During periods of perceived resource scarcity, concerns about the continuing risk 
that serious offenders pose to the group increases individuals’ endorsement of elimination-
focused punishment. Consistent with Study 3, this effect occurs above and beyond partic-
ipants’ socioeconomic status and self-reported political ideology. Moreover, our findings 
in Study 4 demonstrate that the relationship between resource scarcity and endorsement 
of the death penalty is statistically mediated by shifts in the perceived risks associated with 
keeping convicted murderers alive. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
In a series of four studies, we find converging evidence supporting our hypothesis that 
perceived resource scarcity increases endorsement of the death penalty. Using archival 
measures of resource availability and death penalty statistics, we find that indicators of 
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resource scarcity predict codification of capital punishment at the nation level and within 
the United States (Studies 1 & 2). Moreover, experimentally manipulating perceived re-
source availability shifts death penalty beliefs; when resources are scarce, endorsement of 
capital punishment increases (Studies 3 & 4). Additionally, we demonstrate that resource 
scarcity shifts risk calculations in favor of executing severe offenders, which increases en-
dorsement of capital punishment (Study 4). 
 
6.1. Implications 
These findings support a functional psychology of punishment. Although proximate ex-
planations of beliefs about capital punishment (e.g., political ideology, religiosity) are in-
formative, an evolutionary approach provides additional insight into economically “irra-
tional” punishment preferences. For example, in the United States, maintaining the death 
penalty is an expensive endeavor—costing an estimated additional $184 million per year 
in California alone, compared to a “life without parole” permanent imprisonment system 
(Alarcon & Mitchell, 2012). Yet, the evolved mind may not be naturally attuned to these 
modern administrative processes, relying instead on the kinds of cues (e.g., resource avail-
ability) that would have usefully informed punishment strategies across our evolutionary 
history. What appears economically irrational likely remains deeply rational (Ariely, 2008; 
Kahneman, 2011; Kenrick, Li, White, & Neuberg, 2012). 
Our findings may also help explain the recent trend toward abolition occurring within 
highly developed, resource-abundant countries. Indeed, we demonstrate that economi-
cally developed countries are less likely to retain the death penalty. The same finding 
emerged within-nation as well: in the United States, wealthier states are less likely to retain 
the death penalty than poorer states. Despite being an objectively wealthy country (in an 
international context), relatively poor (in a local, U.S. context) states endorse capital pun-
ishment. 
 
6.2. Future directions 
The present studies investigated whether an unexplored ecological factor, resource avail-
ability, can influence the cost-benefit calculus engaged when determining whether to per-
manently remove serious transgressors from the group. However, a potentially important 
moderator—the future expected value of that offender’s contributions to the group—re-
mains to be explored. As previous research illustrates, the future “association value” of an 
offender influences whether we employ punitive or rehabilitative strategies toward those 
specific individuals (Petersen, Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2012). Such findings suggest that 
when an offender possesses certain expertise or social capital, the cost of rehabilitating that 
individual might remain lower than the cost of expulsion regardless of resource availabil-
ity. Indeed, depending on the expertise, removing skilled group members might be espe-
cially costly during times of scarcity (e.g., individuals with specialized knowledge related 
to hunting, gathering, or raiding). Future studies could directly address nuances within 
such cost-benefit analyses by directly manipulating the offender’s value to the group, as 
well as perceived likelihood of successful rehabilitation. 
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6.3. Alternative explanations 
The current study presents an initial exploration of whether perceived resource scarcity 
functionally shapes individuals’ attitudes toward the death penalty. Our hypotheses were 
derived from evolutionary theory and fit within a broader literature supporting an evolved 
psychology that responds flexibly to cues of resource availability (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 
2011; Hill et al., 2012; Neuberg & Schaller, 2016; White et al., 2013a, b). 
One could argue, post hoc, that the predictions tested in the current paper could be 
derived from alternative frameworks. As just one example, system justification theory might 
suggest that resource scarcity threatens the social status quo, which leads people to more 
strongly endorse features of the system (such as capital punishment) as a means of reduc-
ing uncertainty and conflict (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004).3 Certainly, we do not claim that 
an evolutionary perspective is the only framework that could possibly generate our par-
ticular findings. First, however, we note that extant frameworks have not generated a pri-
ori predictions about the ways in which resource scarcity shapes death penalty attitudes, 
nor have they proffered a mediating psychological mechanism for these processes, as is 
described here. Second, our broader approach generates predictions difficult to explain 
from alternative perspectives—for example, that resource scarcity would lead individuals 
to increase their endorsement of the death penalty for low “association value” targets but 
not high “association value” targets (Petersen, Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2012). Third, and 
more generally, it is useful to remember that explanations at different levels of analysis 
should rarely be assumed, a priori, to constitute alternatives. More likely, proximate ex-
planations characterize mechanisms through which more ultimate causes have their ef-
fects, as when ecological features engage psychological mechanisms that create social pref-
erences (e.g., Sng, Neuberg, Varnum, & Kenrick, 2018). Ultimately, we believe this line of 
research offers rich opportunities to reconcile proximate and ultimate explanations of 
death penalty attitudes, providing a more textured understanding of the psychology of 
punishment. 
 
6.4. Conclusions 
Our findings suggest that even seemingly insignificant factors such as perceived fluctua-
tions in resource availability may influence individuals’ endorsement of the death penalty. 
Although the effect of environmental scarcity may be relatively small, this effect could 
have profound implications for public policy (Prentice & Miller, 1992). Public views of 
capital punishment could influence upcoming elections as well as legislative attempts to 
abolish capital punishment. Future research could expand these findings by testing their 
implications for decision-making in political and legislative settings. Additionally, know-
ledge of how these factors influence people’s attitudes toward capital punishment may 
illuminate variability in the sentencing of individual offenders. Understanding what pe-
ripheral factors influence juror decision-making becomes especially important when the 
consequences are—quite literally—life or death. 
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Notes 
1. For exploratory purposes, we examined whether participant sex influenced reported endorse-
ment of the death penalty. We found no effect of sex on endorsement of the death penalty (p = 
.19), and sex did not interact with resource condition (p = .55). 
2. We thank Bill von Hippel for drawing our attention to this possibility. 
3. We thank an anonymous reviewer for posing this alternative. 
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Supplemental Appendix A: Additional Analyses 
Study 4 
Full sample (combined death qualified and non-death-qualified participants) 
 The analyses in the paper present results separately for the death-qualified and non-death-
qualified participants. Here, for comprehensiveness, we present analyses for the full sample of 
participants. 
 As with our focal analyses in the paper, we first attempted to replicate our initial finding 
that resource scarcity increases endorsement of the death penalty using the full sample of partici-
pants. Again, we find that participants primed with resource scarcity reported greater endorse-
ment of the death penalty than participants primed with resource abundance (β = .51, p = .05). 
We then ran a linear regression model including participant socioeconomic status and political 
ideology as covariates, including all interaction terms. Although participants’ political conserva-
tism was a significant predictor of endorsement of the death penalty (β = .31, p = .001), resource 
scarcity remained a marginally significant predictor of death penalty endorsement (β = .12, p = .09). 
Participants’ socioeconomic status was not a significant predictor of death penalty endorsement 
(composite measure: p = .49; single-item measure: p = .07). The effect of resource scarcity on 
death penalty endorsement was not moderated by socioeconomic status, political ideology, or the 
interaction of the two (all ps > .25). See Supplemental Table 1. 
 We then examined whether resource scarcity shifted participants’ perceived cost of error 
in favor of executing convicted murderers. As predicted, participants primed with resource scar-
city reported greater willingness to err on the side of executing convicted murderers than partici-
pants primed with resource abundance (β = .16, p = .02). Again, we examined whether this effect 
held after controlling for participant socioeconomic status and political ideology by regressing 
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participants’ reported cost of error onto socioeconomic status, political ideology, resource condi-
tion, and all interaction terms. Participants’ socioeconomic status was not a significant predictor 
of participants’ cost of error in favor of execution (composite measure: p = .86; single-item 
measure: p = .20). Although participants’ political conservatism was a significant predictor of 
participants’ cost of error in favor of execution (β = .28, p = .005), the effect of resource scarcity 
still accounted for a substantial proportion of variance in perceived cost of error (β = .15, p = .03). 
Moreover, this effect was not moderated by socioeconomic status, political ideology, or the inter-
action of the two (all ps > .23). See Supplemental Table 2. 
 To examine whether changes in perceived cost of error mediated shifts in endorsement of 
the death penalty, we used Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) bootstrapping method to test for a signifi-
cant indirect effect of resource scarcity on endorsement of the death penalty for 5,000 boot-
strapped samples. The indirect effect of resource scarcity on endorsement of the death penalty 
was estimated to lie between 0.678 and 0.927 with 95% confidence (β = 0.503, SE = 0.22). Be-
cause zero was not included in the 95% confidence intervals, this analysis demonstrates signifi-
cant mediation. That is, the scarcity threat prime altered participants’ cost of error, which, in 
turn, predicted participants’ endorsement of the death penalty. The direct effect of scarcity on en-
dorsement of the death penalty becomes statistically nonsignificant when cost of error is in-
cluded in the equation (p > .25), suggesting full mediation. See Supplemental Figure 1. 
 Finally, we conducted a 2 (Death Qualification: Yes, No) × 2 (Resource Availability: 
Scarcity, Abundance) ANOVA with death penalty endorsement as our dependent variable. There 
was a significant main effect of death qualification, such that death qualified participants (M = 4.57, 
SD = 1.42) exhibited greater endorsement of the death penalty than non-death-qualified partici-
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pants (M = 2.92, SD = 2.04), F(1, 196) = 45.49, p < .001, partial eta2 = .19. There was a margin-
ally significant main effect of resource condition, such that participants in the scarcity condition 
(M = 4.19, SD = 1. 79) exhibited greater endorsement of the death penalty than participants in 
the abundance condition (M = 3.67, SD = 1.91), F(1, 196) = 2.85, p = .09, partial eta2 = .01. The 
Death Qualification × Resource Availability interaction was not significant, p = .35. We note 
that our non-death-qualified sample was significantly smaller (n = 78) than our death qualified 
sample (n = 122), increasing the difficulty of detecting a significant interaction. 
 In sum, our findings using the full sample of participants mirror our findings within the 
death qualified participants reported in Study 4, despite including participants who stated having 
such strong views opposing the death penalty that their ability to be impartial in making death 
penalty decisions would be impaired. 
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Supplemental Appendix B: Figure and Tables 
Figure S1. Standardized regression coefficients and p-values for the relationship between resource 
scarcity and endorsement of the death penalty as mediated by cost of error in full sample of par-
ticipants (Study 4). 
 
Note: † p = .051, * p < .05, *** p < .001 
Table S1. Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Participants’ Endorsement 
of the Death Penalty (full sample, N = 198) 
 
Variable β (p) SE β 
Resource Scarcity .12 (.09) .07 
Socioeconomic Status .07 (.49) .10 
Political Ideology .31 (.001) .10 
Socioeconomic Status × Resource Scarcity Interaction –.02 (.84) .10 
Political Ideology × Resource Scarcity Interaction –.04 (.68) .09 
Socioeconomic Status × Political Ideology Interaction –.01 (.88) .09 
Socioeconomic Status × Resource Scarcity × Political 
     Ideology Interaction .02 (.85) .09 
R2  .11 
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Table S2. Summary of Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Death Qualified 
Participants’ Perceived Cost of Error (full sample, N = 199) 
 
Variable β (p) SE β 
Resource Scarcity .15 (.03) .07 
Socioeconomic Status –.02 (.86) .10 
Political Ideology .28 (.005) .10 
Socioeconomic Status × Resource Scarcity Interaction .01 (.89) .10 
Political Ideology × Resource Scarcity Interaction –.05 (.64) .10 
Socioeconomic Status × Political Ideology Interaction –.04 (.66) .09 
Socioeconomic Status × Resource Scarcity × Political 
    Ideology Interaction .03 (.78) .09 
R2  .09 
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Supplemental Appendix C: Study Materials 
Study 3 
 
Participants were asked to rate items on how much they agreed with them from 1 (strongly disa-
gree) to 9 (strongly agree). 
 
Death Penalty Endorsement Scale: 
 
I think the death penalty is necessary. 
The death penalty should be used more often than it is. 
The length of time between sentencing someone to death and actually executing them should be 
shorter than it currently is. 
 
Study 4 
 
Unless otherwise noted, participants were asked to rate items on how much they agreed with 
them from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
 
Death Penalty Endorsement Scale: 
 
I think the death penalty is necessary. 
The death penalty should be used more often than it is. 
It is immoral for society to take a life regardless of the crime the individual has committed. (R) 
For some crimes the death penalty is the most appropriate punishment regardless of how much 
money it costs to carry out an execution. 
It is the moral responsibility of society to execute people who commit certain kinds of crimes. 
To what extent do you support the death penalty? (measured on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(extremely)) 
 
Cost of Error Scale: 
 
Keeping convicted murderers alive is too great a risk for society to take. 
It is better to execute convicted murderers than risk they will murder again. 
The death penalty is the only way to ensure a convicted murderer does not murder again. 
Allowing a convicted murderer to eventually be released from prison greatly endangers society. 
It is so important to keep the rest of society safe that the legal system should err in the direction 
of executing murderers even if doing so might occasionally be an error. 
